Kant's Moral Philosophy

« Just as the first Critique set out critically the synthetic a priori principles of theoretical reason, the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785) set out critically the synthetic a priori principles of practical reason.

This is a brief and eloquent presentation of Kant's moral system. In morals, Kant's starting point is that the only thing which is good without qualification is a good will.

Talents, character, self-control, and fortune can be used to bad ends; even happiness can be corrupting.

It is not what it achieves that constitutes the goodness of a good will; good will is good in itself alone. Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny, or by the niggardly endowment of stepmotherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left ...

; even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself. It is not in order to pursue happiness that human beings have been endowed with a will; instinct would have been far more effective for this purpose.

Reason was given to us in order to produce a will which was good not as a means to some further end, but good in itself.

Good will is the highest good and the condition of all other goods, including happiness. What, then, makes a will good in itself? To answer this question we must investigate the concept of duty.

To act from duty is to exhibit good will in the face of difficulty.

But we must distinguish between acting in accordance with duty, and acting from the motive of duty.

A grocer who is honest from selfinterest, or a philanthropist who delights in the contentment of others, may do actions which are in accord with duty.

But actions of this kind, however right and amiable, have, according to Kant, no moral worth.

Worth of character is shown only when someone does good not from inclination, but from duty: when, for instance, a man who has lost all taste for life and longs for death still does his best to preserve his own life in accordance with the moral law. Kant's teaching here is directly opposed to that of Aristotle.

Aristotle taught that people were not really virtuous as long as their exercise of virtue went against the grain; the really virtuous person thoroughly enjoyed performing acts of virtue. For Kant, on the other hand, it is the painfulness of well-doing that is the real mark of virtue.

He realizes that he has set daunting standards for moral conduct: he is quite prepared to contemplate the possibility that there has never been, in fact, an action performed solely on moral grounds and out of a sense of duty. What is it, then, to act from duty? To act from duty is to act out of reverence for the moral law; and the way to test whether one is so acting is to seek the maxim, or principle, on which one acts, that is to say, the imperative to which one's act conforms.

There are two sorts of imperative, hypothetical and categorical.

The hypothetical imperative says: If you wish to achieve a certain end, act in such-and-such a way.

The categorical imperative says: No matter what end you wish to achieve, act in such-and-such a way.

There are many hypothetical imperatives, because there are many different ends which humans may set themselves.

There is only one categorical imperative, which is this ‘Act only according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a universal law.' Kant illustrates this with several examples, of which we may mention two.

The first is this.

Having run out of funds, I may be tempted to borrow money, though I know that I will be unable to repay it.

I am acting on the maxim ‘Whenever I believe myself short of money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, though I know that this will never be done'. I cannot will that everyone should act on this maxim, because if everyone did so the whole institution of promising would collapse.

Hence, borrowing money in these circumstances would violate the categorical imperative. A second example is this.

A person who is well provided for, and is asked for help by others suffering hardship, may be tempted to respond ‘What does this matter to me? Let every one be as happy as Heaven wills or as he can make himself; I won't harm him, but I won't help him either.' He cannot will this maxim to be universalized, because a situation might arise in which he himself needed love and sympathy from others. These cases illustrate two different ways in which the categorical imperative applies.

In the first case, the maxim cannot be universalized because its universalization involves contradiction (if no one keeps promises, there is no such thing as promising).

In the second case, the maxim can be universalized without contradiction, but no one could rationally will the situation which would result from its universalization.

Kant says the two different cases correspond to two different kinds of duty: strict duties, and meritorious duties. Not all Kant's examples are convincing.

He argues, for instance, that the categorical imperative excludes suicide.

But however wrong suicide may be, there is nothing self-contradictory in the prospect of universal suicide; and someone sufficiently despairing might regard it as a consummation devoutly to be wished. Kant offers a further formulation of the categorical imperative.

‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.' He claims, though he has not convinced many of his readers, that this is equivalent to the earlier imperative, and enables the same practical conclusions to be drawn.

It is, in fact, more effective than the earlier formulation in ruling out suicide.

To take one's own life, Kant urges, is to use one's own person as a means of bringing to an end one's discomfort and distress. As a human being, Kant says, I am not only an end in myself, I am a member of a kingdom of ends, a union of rational beings under common laws.

My will, as has been said, is rational in so far as its maxims can be made universal laws.

The converse of this is that universal law is law which is made by rational wills like mine.

A rational being ‘is subject only to laws which are made by himself and yet are universal'.

In the kingdom of ends, we are all both legislators and subjects. The reader is reminded of Rousseau's general will. Kant concludes the exposition of his moral system with a panegyric to the dignity of virtue.

In the kingdom of ends, everything has a price or a worth.

If something has a price, it can be exchanged for something else.

What has worth is unique and unexchangeable; it is beyond price.

There are, Kant says, two kinds of price: market price, which is related to the satisfaction of need; and fancy price, which is related to the satisfaction of taste.

Morality is above and beyond either kind of price. ‘Morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has worth.

Skill and diligence in work have a market price; wit, lively imagination and humour have a fancy price; but fidelity to promises and kindness based on principle (not on instinct) have an intrinsic worth.' Kant's words echoed throughout the nineteenth century, and still strike a chord with many people today.. »