Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Anselm of Canterbury

« Anselm of Canterbury The next major figure in the Western intellectual tradition and the dominant thinker of the late eleventh century is A nselm of C anterbury.74 M arenbon arrives at an ambivalent judgement in his case, on one hand denying him the title of ‘philosopher' because his argumentation does not arrive finally at its conclusions but assumes them from the outset, and on the other conceding it in recognition of his contributions to the study of the language—thought relation and of the logic of possibility and necessity.

Y et it is possible to reevaluate Anselm's philosophical contribution under the three headings proposed earlier: structure, text and polysemy. A nselm exploits the notion of structure in developing a variant of the classical P latonic T heory of Forms during the early chapters of M onologion which combines ontological and ‘semiotic' criteria.

The ontological viewpoint is clearly indicated when he describes a set of transcendent i.e.

atemporal and nonspatial principles, each of which is termed an ‘exemplar' (exemplum), ‘form' (forma), or ‘rule' (regula) (M onologion 9, 24.

7–20).

It is either present in the divine mind or an aspect of the divine essence,75 and is somehow the cause of lower i.e.

spatio-temporal things.76 T he semiotic viewpoint is adopted implicitly when A nselm introduces the set of transcendent principles with a discourse based on semantic permutation. In the first place, there is an argument in the abstract.

This is founded on the following inventory of semantic elements: two terms—the plurality of things having property x (a1,a2.

.) and the single property x (b); two relations co nstitutive of terms—effect of a nother (R ) and effect of itself (R ); two terms constituted by relations—the plurality of things having property x through another (aa1, aa2.

.) and the single property x through itself (bb); and three relations—greater than (R>), less than (R aa1, aa2.

.]. In the second place, the argument is applied to three concrete instances: where property x is identified with ‘good' sensed or understood, ‘great' sensed or understood, and ‘existent' sensed or understood respectively. Important features of A nselm's philosophical method are revealed here.

For example, it seems that there is l e s s an alternation of premisses and conclusions—as in formal logic—than a permutation of semantic properties.

In fact, the whole discourse can be understood in semantic terms with the exception of the idea (point 3 above) that the property x is itself x.

This is purely ontological in character, since it makes no sense to say that the semantic property x has the semantic property x.

Furthermore, it appears that the permutation of semantic properties follows a largely symmetrical pattern, the clearest indication of a writer's thinking in structural terms. It would be inappropriate to seek the relation to textual authorities here which was apparent in Eriugena.

The difference between the two philosophers seems extreme, given that A nselm's works—especially Monologion and P roslogion—are attempts to construct a discourse ‘by reason alone' (sola ratione) without explicit dependence on sources.80 Nevertheless, A nselm's relation to textual authorities is different from that of his predecessor rather than non-existent. A lthough numerous Latin patristic sources are mentioned in the extant letters, the only authority cited in the treatises themselves is A ugustine.

But this citation is of overwhelming interpretative significance.

In the preface to M onologion, the writer diverts potential criticism that he is advocating novel or false teachings by stressing the complete agreement between the doctrines of his book and those of Augustine's O n the T rinity ([6.11] I:8.

8–14).

Some modern scholars would interpret this as the typical statement of a medieval writer endeavouring to conceal the novelty of his thought behind a declaration of traditionalism.

However, A nselm's remarks are more than a rhetorical commonplace.

This becomes clear on analysing the Monologion into an assemblage of A ugustinian materials reorganized according to the structural principles described above. A nselm's relation to textual authorities is even indicated by the P roslogion, which cites no source at all.

This treatise contains a famous passage where a premiss that God is ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought' (aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit) is postulated as self-evident, the premiss then being used as the starting point for an argument allegedly proceeding by the application of reason alone to the conclusion that God exists ([6.11] I:101.

1–4, 104.

7).

But even if one were to concede the premiss to be self-evident—a dubious point in itself—one could not consider it independent of textual background.

In fact, the premiss corresponds to a definition of God found in C hristian texts like A ugustine's O n the Customs of the C atholic C hurch and those of the Manicheans ([6.11] I:11.

24) and Boethius' On the C onsolation of Philosophy ([6.11] I:10, 57–8), and in secular works like C icero's On the Nature of the Gods ([6.11] I:77) and Seneca's Natural Questions81 to name only the most obvious parallels.

So A nselm's purpose was perhaps to recommend the faith to non-C hristians by deducing it from a premiss stated by C hristian and non-C hristian authors alike. A nselm obviously does not exploit the notion of multiple meanings in texts; indeed, the ideal of univocity would seem more consistent with his method. Nevertheless, some of his ideas about signification, had they been extended in a different direction, would have supported the exploitation of polysemy. One suggestive idea is the distinction between appellation and signification elaborated in the treatise De grammatico.

Here, he argues that in statements like ‘the horse is white', the adjective is ‘appellative' (appellativum) of the white thing but ‘significative' (significativum) of its possession of the property ([6.11] I:159.

12–15, 161.

21).

Since he stresses that what is appellated is an existent object but what is signified is not, the distinction seems to approximate that between reference and sense in modern linguistic theory.82 However, any Platonist would maintain that in the statement ‘the horse is x', the x signifies a transcendentally existent x-ness in which Socrates participates.

This is the viewpoint which also seems to underlie the argument about divine attributes in M onologion 1–4.83 A nother aspect of A nselm's theory of signification conducive to the systematic exploitation of polysemy is his notion of a ‘speaking' (locutio) within the divine nature.

By explaining that the exemplar in the divine mind according to which all things are created is a speaking (see p.

133), he follows traditional patristic teachings regarding the Word as second person of the Trinity.84 However, the use of the term ‘speaking' also requires a rational justification. A nselm therefore proposes to distinguish three ways of speaking about an object:85 1 Speaking of things by employing sensible signs in a sensible manner e.g.

signifying a man by using the word ‘man'—such signs being unmotivated and nonuniversal; 2 Thinking by employing sensible and external signs in an insensible and internal manner e.g.

silently thinking the word ‘man'—these signs also being unmotivated and non-universal; 3 Speaking things themselves by employing sensible signs in neither a sensible nor an insensible manner e.g.

perceiving a man either by imagining his sensible shape or by thinking his universal essence ‘animal, rational, mortal'—such signs being motivated and universal.87 It is the third type of speaking which can be attributed to the divine mind.88 The exemplar in the latter, according to which all things are created, can therefore be described as a thinking process coextensive with rather than anterior to the manipulation of signs.89 With this argument, A nselm points towards that elimination of the distinction between cognitive and verbal characteristic of post-Saussurian linguistic theory albeit from a restricted theological perspective (cf.

pp.

128–9). A nother suggestive idea is the application of metaphor to philosophical method underlying the entire Monologion.

Towards the end of that text A nselm raises an important question: given that the divine nature surpasses human understanding and is accessible only through words whose meaning is transformed, how true are all the inferences constructed from such words in respect of the divinity?90 He answers that there is a certain truth in things signified ‘not properly but through some likeness' (non proprie...sed per aliquam similitudinem).

T he passage should be noted by those modern scholars who agonize over the cogency of A nselm's arguments about God, since he shows clearly that the ‘logic' which they contain is intended to be not the embodiment but only the reflection of truth.91 A pparently, logical metaphor is to logic in the Monologion what arithmetical metaphor was to arithmetic in Eriugena's exposition of the divine names.. »